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THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF
1969 AND NUCLEAR POWER PLANT LICENSING:
JUDICIAL MODIFICATION OF AGENCY
RULEMAKING-NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE
COUNCIL, INC. V. NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
In 1946, Congress enacted the nation's first atomic energy act,' au-
thorizing exclusive government control of the peacetime use of nuclear
energy.' The era of commercial development of nuclear power was ush-
ered in with the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.1 The purpose
of both acts was to improve the general welfare of the country through
the development of nuclear technology within the bounds of the national
defense and the health and safety of the public.4
Despite this national commitment to the public welfare, the health
and safety of the public has been ignored in certain areas of nuclear
power plant licensing. In particular, the problem of long-term radioac-
tive waste management' has not been addressed satisfactorily by nu-
1. Act of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755 [hereinafter referred to as 42 U.S.C. §2011
(1970)1.
2. Id. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 created the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
for the purpose of fully controlling research and development of nuclear technology and
the construction and use of federal nuclear power plants.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§2011-2296 (1970). Section 103 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 author-
ized the AEC to issue nuclear power plant licenses "for industrial or commercial pur-
poses." 42 U.S.C. §2133 (1970). The 1954 Act vested in the AEC the dual responsibilities
for promotion and regulation of nuclear technology. Id. 42 U.S.C. §§2011(b), 2012(e)
(1970). After public criticism of these incompatible functions began to grow in the 1960's,
Congress responded by enacting the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §5801
(Supp. V 1975); S. REP. No. 980, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). The regulatory, or licensing,
aspect of nuclear energy development was vested in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC); research and development activities were allocated to the Energy Research and
Development Administration (ERDA). 42 U.S.C. §§5842, 5801(b) (Supp. V 1975).
4. 42 U.S.C. §2011(b) (1970).
5. "Radioactive (or nuclear) waste management" will be used in this Note to refer to
both nuclear waste disposal and fuel reprocessing activities. These two events are a portion
of the "uranium fuel cycle," a chain of events beginning with the mining and shipping of
uranium ores to a materials plant and ending with fuel reprocessing and nuclear waste
disposal. Given that only the passage of time results in the detoxification of radioactive
wastes created by the operation of nuclear power plants, "waste disposal" will be used
here to mean the physical isolation and storage of wastes. "Fuel reprocessing" will be used
to refer to that part of the uranium fuel cycle in which fertile and fissile spent fuel
elements discharged from the nuclear reaction are recovered, re-enriched and refabricated
into usable fuel elements for subsequent reactions. See S. GLASSTONE, SOURCEBOOK ON
ATOMIC ENERGO, §§15.185-87, at 616 (3d ed. 1967).
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clear energy administrators.' In recent years, the growing accumulation
of highly toxic military and commercial wastes' has concerned both
critics and advocates of nuclear power.'
The passage of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA)l further highlighted the problems of power plant licensing and
nuclear waste management. In enacting NEPA, Congress intended to
end crisis decisionmaking in areas affecting the "human environment"
by requiring each federal agency to balance "to the fullest extent possi-
ble" environmental costs of a proposed action against economic and
6. See Moore, The Environmentalist and Radioactive Waste, 49 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 55,
63-66, 79 (1972); Reis, Environmental Activism: Thermal Pollution-AEC and State Ju-
risdictional Considerations, 13 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REv. 633, 675-77 (1972); Comment,
Radioactive Waste: A Failure in Governmental Regulation, 37 ALB. L. Rav. 97, 129-30
(1972). See also 121 CONG. REc. 2622 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 1975) (remarks of Rep. Drinan).
7. Although the volume of commercial nuclear waste now being produced by reactors
is small, it is estimated that the nation will need approximately 200,000 cubic feet of
storage space by the year 2000 and 500,000 cubic feet by 2010. See 188 SCIENCE 345 (Apr.
25, 1975). In addition, military waste, having been produced since 1944 by "less sophisti-
cated chemical methods" than current commercial waste, is beginning to leak from tem-
porary holding tanks into the surrounding soil. See Farney, Ominous Problem: What To
Do With Radioactive Waste, 5 SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE 20 (April, 1974); 121 CONG. Rzc.
2622 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 1975) (remarks of Rep. Drinan). The problem of growing accumu-
lation of nuclear waste is only one facet of the waste disposal issue. Of even greater
importance is the fact that minute quantities of radioactive waste are highly toxic.
8. See note 7 supra. High-level radioactive wastes, which are produced by the reprocess-
ing of spent fuel from nuclear reactors, must be isolated from the biosphere for up to
250,000 years to be kept from endangering mankind. Plutonium-239, for example, has a
half-life of nearly 25,000 years; it must be isolated for at least 250,000 years before its
toxicity has decreased sufficiently for it to be released into the environment. Bethe, The
Necessity of Fission Power, 234 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 21, 28 (January, 1976). Plutonium is
thought to be one of the most toxic substances known; inhalation of a single dust particle
is thought to cause lung cancer. Id. at 29. Two other radioisotopes which make up much
of the radioactive waste from nuclear reactors are strontium-90 and cesium-137, with half-
lives of approximately 30 years; they must be isolated from the environment for 600 to
1000 years. See Farney, supra note 7. The main problem regarding radioactive wastes is
that they must be isolated for a longer period than an existing civilization or government
can plan effectively. The NRC and ERDA have suggested both long- and short-term
projects for nuclear waste storage (e.g., retrievable surface repository; permanent disposal
in underground salt beds), but all plans have proven to be unsatisfactory. See 188 SCIENCE
345 (Apr. 24, 1975); 190 SCIENCE 361 (Oct. 24, 1975). For example, one effort to build an
underground radioactive waste storage facility in bedded salt layers was frustrated by the
discovery of a large pocket of brine, containing toxic gases in solution. Such gases could
present a safety hazard for construction workers or persons operating the facility. Also,
the brine solution could indicate that fluids have been penetrating the area. Toxic nuclear
wastes stored underground could escape to the surface in these penetrating fluids. See 190
SCIENCE 361 (Oct. 24, 1975).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4347 (1970).
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technical considerations. 10 The balancing process is to be carried out in
a "detailed statement" prepared by each federal agency for proposals
significantly affecting the quality of the environment."
Courts have held that the licensing of nuclear energy facilities suffi-
ciently affects the environment to require such a "detailed statement"
under NEPA. 2 Several issues have not been resolved by the courts,
10. Section 102 of NEPA provides:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible:
(1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be
interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this
chapter...
(2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall-
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the
integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design
arts in planning and in decisionmaking which may have an impact on man's
environment;
(B) identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation with the
Council on Environmental Quality established by subchapter H of this chapter,
which will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and val-
ues may be given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along with eco-
nomic and technical considerations;
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between the local short-term uses of man's envi-
ronment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term produc-
tivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be imple-
mented.
42 U.S.C. §4332 (1970).
11. Id. NEPA also provides that the courts are to interpret "the policies, regulations,
and public laws of the United States. . . in accordance with this Act." Id. Section 101 of
NEPA declares a standard of using "all practicable means, consistent with other essential
considerations of national policy" to carry out NEPA's mandate of environmental protec-
tion. This standard would seem to be less stringent than §102's "to the fullest extent
possible" standard. However, case law indicates that the stricter §102 standard applies
to the procedural duties to give full consideration to environmental issues. See, e.g.,
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), in which
the court held that agency consideration of environmental matters "must be more than a
pro forma ritual." 449 F.2d at 1128. Thus, even the nation's commitment to nuclear power
must be weighed in light of NEPA's broad mandate of environmental protection. See
Citizens for Safe Power, Inc. v. NRC, 524 F.2d 1291, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
12. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir.
1971). In Calvert Cliffs', the court of appeals remanded, for further rulemaking, the
[Vol. 26:666
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however. For example, no judicial guidelines for evaluating the effects
of radioactive wastes have been established for administrators in power
plant licensing proceedings. In addition, the courts have provided no
guidance concerning how thoroughly the environmental impact of nu-
clear waste should be examined in the public record.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recently
addressed these issues in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.3 Natural Resources is a consolidation
of two petitions for review, both concerning the manner in which repro-
cessing and disposal of nuclear wastes must be considered in power
plant licensing proceedings. The first case involved an individual nu-
clear power facility, the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station." In
that proceeding, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board 5 held
that licensing boards"6 need not consider the environmental effects of
nuclear waste management in individual hearings. 7 The second case
Atomic Energy Commission's rules relating to power plant licensing. The court held that
the licensing rules did not provide for "a wide variety of environmental issues." For
example, the Atomic Energy Commission indicated in its rules that it would defer totally
to the environmental quality standards of other agencies. The court held that the AEC
must perform its own balancing test of environmental costs and economic and technical
benefits for each proposed agency action significantly affecting the environment. Such
consideration was found clearly to be compelled by NEPA. Id. at 1122-23.
13. 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3553, 3554 (Feb. 22, 1977).
14. In re Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 4 A.E.C. 930 (ALAB-56) (June 6, 1972).
15. The NRC has authorized the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board (ASLAB)
"to exercise the authority and perform the review functions which would otherwise have
been exercised and performed by the Commission." 10 C.F.R. §2.785(a) (1976). The
ALSAB may certify to the NRC, or the NRC may review, sua sponte, "major or novel
questions of policy, law or procedure." Id. §2.785(d) (1976). The court of appeals may
review a final decision of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board or of the NRC.
28 U.S.C. §2342(4).
16. In enacting the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Congress provided that the Atomic
Energy Commission was authorized to establish three-member atomic safety and licensing
boards to grant or revoke power plant licenses. 42 U.S.C. §2241(a) (1970). Under the
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, "all orders, determinations, rules, regulations, per-
mits, contracts, certificates, licenses, and privileges" made by the Atomic Energy Com-
mission pursuant to its regulatory function were transferred to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. 42 U.S.C. §5871(b) (Supp. V 1975). The NRC's regulations are located in
10 C.F.R. Parts 0-199 (1976).
17. In re Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 4 A.E.C. 930 (ALAB-56) (June 6, 1972).
No nuclear power plant may operate without an operating license. 42 U.S.C. §2131 (1970).
Two separate proceedings comprise the "licensing" of a nuclear power facility. The first
proceeding determines whether the NRC will issue a construction permit for the proposed
nuclear reactor. A public hearing must be held after thirty days' notice in the Federal
Register on each application for a construction permit. 42 U.S.C. §2239(a) (1970). The
second proceeding determines whether the constructed facility should be licensed to oper-
ate. 42 U.S.C. §2235 (1970).
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involved an informal rulemaking proceeding instituted to reexamine the
waste management issues considered in the Vermont Yankee case.,'
As a result of the rulemaking, the NRC concluded that the environ-
mental impact of the nuclear fuel cycle is "relatively insignificant" with
respect to an individual nuclear reactor," but decided nevertheless to
factor such effects into the cost-benefit analysis for each proposed reac-
tor. In accord with this conclusion, a rule was promulgated quantifying
the environmental effects of the fuel cycle for an individual reactor,
including the "insignificant" impact of waste management."0 The rule
required a series of numerical values to be factored into the initial cost-
benefit analysis for each facility." In addition, the rule provided that no
further discussion of the environmental effects of the fuel cycle would
The procedure used to obtain a construction permit begins with the filing of an applica-
tion for a permit with the NRC, accompanied by the applicant's Preliminary Safety
Analysis Report and Environment Report. 10 C.F.R. §§50.30(f), 50.34(a), 50.30(e) (1976).
The NRC staff and the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards examine the applica-
tion and accompanying reports and conduct meetings with the applicant to insure that
the NRC's regulations are satisfied. 10 C.F.R. Parts 0-199 (1976). The staff prepares its
own Draft Environmental Statement, which it circulates among federal or state agencies
having jurisdiction or expertise in the areas of anticipated environmental impacts. The
draft is also made available for public comment. 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(c) (1970). The NRC's
Final Environmental Statement includes comments received in response to the draft from
reviewing agencies and the public. The NRC staff then must determine that the public
health and safety is not endangered by the proposed facility, and that the power plant's
potential benefits appear to outweigh social, economic and environmental costs. Following
these determinations, the NRC must conduct a public hearing on the proposed construc-
tion permit. 42 U.S.C. §2239 (1976).
At the hearing, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board reviews the application and
supporting statements. The procedures used are specified in the Administrative Procedure
Act and in the NRC regulations. 5 U.S.C. §558(c) (1970); 10 C.F.R. Part 2, Subpart G
(1976). At the conclusion of the hearing the licensing board determines whether the permit
should be issued and orders accordingly.
Once the nuclear plant is constructed, any additional information which will bring the
application up to date must be filed. If the facility is found to be in conformity with the
application and the NRC's rules and regulations, an operating license will be issued by
the NRC. Any person whose interest may be affected by the granting of a license may
request a hearing and will be admitted as a party to such proceeding. 42 U.S.C. §2239
(1970).
18. The rulemaking hearing was held on February 1-3, 1973, after publication of a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 37 FED. REo. 24191 (1972) and Notice of Hearing, 38 FED.
REG. 49 (1973). Oral statements and questions by the hearing board were permitted by
the NRC, but discovery and cross-examination were excluded. 38 FED. REG. 49 (1973).
19. 39 FED. REO. 14188, 14190 (1974).
20. The NRC described the environmental effects of the uranium fuel cycle as
"relatively insignificant" in discussing its decision not to require retroactive application
of the table of numerical values. Id.
21. 39 FED. REG. 14188, 14191 (1974). The rule is codified at 10 C.F.R. §51.20(e) (1976).
[Vol. 26:666
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be permitted. 2
The Natural Resources court overturned the Appeal Board's findings
in the Vermont Yankee case. The court held that the environmental
effects of nuclear waste disposal and reprocessing must be reviewed in
individual licensing proceedings, absent rulemaking proceedings effec-
tively considering these issues. 23 As to the rulemaking case, the court
found that the NRC's considerations of the waste disposal and repro-
cessing issues failed to meet NEPA's mandate of a careful and informed
decisionmaking process.2 ' The portions of the NRC's rule pertaining to
nuclear waste management were set aside and remanded for more thor-
ough ventilation of the issues.2 5
Natural Resources is important because it is the first decision inter-
preting NEPA to require consideration of the environmental effects of
nuclear waste management at the construction permit stage of reactor
licensing. The decision is also significant in that it views NEPA as
mandating rigorous judicial scrutiny of administrative records contain-
ing environmental issues.2" That is, courts are to insure that agency
decisionmaking processes comply with NEPA's substantive policy of
environmental protection." However, the actual procedural require-
ments of NEPA with respect to rulemaking are left somewhat unclear
by the court in Natural Resources. The question whether NEPA does
mandate a specific standard of rulemaking activity will be considered
by the United States Supreme Court on review.2 1
The purpose of this Note is to discuss the court's interpretation of
NEPA's procedural and substantive requirements with regard to infor-
mal rulemaking in the environmental area. In addition, it will examine
22. 39 FED. REG. 14188 (1974).
23. 547 F.2d at 641.
24. Id. at 654-55. The order granting an operating license for the Vermont Yankee power
plant was also remanded to await the outcome of further rulemaking proceedings. Id. at
641.
25. Id. at 655.
26. Id. at 644-46, 654.
27. Id. at 645. Case law and NEPA's legislative history seem to be unanimous in sup-
porting the view that NEPA sets a high standard for agency decisionmaking, which "must
be vigorously enforced by the reviewing courts." See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1975); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d
946 (7th Cir. 1973); Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079
(D.C. Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. Army Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289
(8th Cir. 1972); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C.
Cir. 1972); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
See also Hearings on S. 1075, S.237 and S. 1752 Before Senate Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 116, 206, 296 (1969).
28. 45 U.S.L.W. 3553, 3554 (Feb. 22, 1977).
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the impact of the Natural Resources decision upon future nuclear power
plant licensing. Finally, this Note will analyze the argument that the
court's lack of guidance for future rulemaking ultimately could destroy
the advantages of informal rulemaking.
SIGNIFICANCE OF Natural Resources TO ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONMAKING
AND INFORMAL RULEMAKING
Consideration of environmental values by federal agencies is manda-
tory under NEPA. 5 The Act insures the weighing of environmental fac-
tors by imposing procedural requirements designed to enforce the sub-
stantive policy of the Act. 0 An understanding of NEPA's relationship
to agency rulemaking must precede a discussion of Natural Resources'
significance to environmental decisionmaking.
A. NEPA and Informal Rulemaking
The minimum requirements for informal rulemaking3' by federal
agencies are set out in §553 of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).3 1 Such a proceeding is called "notice and comment" rulemaking
29. See note 10 supra.
30. 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(c) (1970). See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC,
449 F.2d at 1112.
31. There are two categories of rulemaking provided for in the APA, "formal" rulemak-
ing (rulemaking required by statute to be made on the record after an opportunity for an
agency hearing) and "informal" rulemaking. See 5 U.S.C. §§553(c), 556, 557 (1970). For
a discussion of the significance of the phrase "on the record after opportunity for an agency
hearing" to rulemaking, see United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973)
and United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972).
32. Administrative Procedure Act §4, 5 U.S.C. §553 [hereinafter referred to as APA
§553] (the "minimum" rulemaking requirements) provides that:
(b) General notice of proposed rulemaking shall be published in the Federal
Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served
or otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law. The notice shall
include-
(1) a statement of the time, place and nature of public rule making
proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed;
and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description
of the subjects and issues involved . ..
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested per-
sons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of
written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presenta-
tion. After consideration of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall
incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and
purpose. . ..
[Vol. 26:666
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because it requires publication of notice of proposed rulemaking in the
Federal Register" and opportunity for interested persons to comment on
the rule through "written data, views or arguments."'3' In addition, the
APA requires that a statement containing the "basis and purpose" of
the rule be incorporated into the final rule itself.3 Case law has indi-
cated that in rulemaking, agency officials acting within the scope of
their authority have discretion to choose procedures they feel will pro-
duce an adequate record . 3 In fact, administrators may choose to imple-
ment rulemaking procedures in excess of the minimum "notice and
comment" requirements. 7 Often, procedures such as cross-examination
or interrogatories are borrowed from formal proceedings. Informal rule-
making with such adjudicatory procedures is known as "hybrid" rule-
making.38
In the past few years, courts have imposed additional procedures upon
informal rulemaking proceedings when certain issues and basic consid-
erations of fairness were involved . 3  Moreover, courts have indicated
5 U.S.C. §553 (1970).
33. Id.
34. Id. "Opportunity to comment" does not necessarily mean "oral presentation."
Under APA §553(c), it is within the agency's discretion to allow oral presentations.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947); Siegel v. AEC, 400 F.2d
778, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 236 n.6 (1973); City
of Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972).
38. At its best, hybrid rulemaking combines the advantages of informal rulemaking
(e.g., procedural flexibility; wide notification of proposed agency action; participation of
interested parties in agency policy decisions; ability to declare law prospectively; effi-
ciency; ability to look beyond record in order to draw upon agency expertise) with the
advantages of case-by-case adjudication (e.g., maximum consideration of individual cir-
cumstances; temporary judgments subject to later adjustments; application of sanctions
to wrongdoers whose harmful conduct was not foreseeable). See Verkuil, Judicial Review
of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REv. 185 (1974); Note, The Judicial Role in Defining
Procedural Requirements for Agency Rulemaking, 87 HARv. L. Rxv. 782 (1974). At its
worst, hybrid rulemaking could develop into a method for delay or a bargaining tool,
prevent high-level administrators or scientists from participating in agency proceedings,
destroy agency flexibility to experiment with different procedures, or upset the balance
between agency expertise and public participation. See Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking"
Under the Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. Cm. L.
REv. 401, 443-44 (1975); Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of
Judicial Review, 59 CORNELL L. Rv. 375, 387-88 (1974).
39. See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Shaffer, 491 F.2d 59, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (broad issues of
public health and safety); International Harvester v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 631 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) ("soft" and sensitive subjects and witnesses); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA,
477 F.2d 495, 503 (4th Cir. 1973) (nature and "drastic impact" of regulations); Friends of
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that a specific statutory provision for judicial review may imply a Con-
gressional intent that courts assume an expanded role in reviewing
agency rulemaking. Such provision also may imply a need for an ex-
panded record.4
Several courts have imposed procedures in excess of the APA mini-
mum in cases involving environmental concerns.4' However, prior to
the Earth v. AEC, 485 F.2d 1031, 1032-33 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (possibility of imminent danger
to life and health); Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(imports and need for coordination with governmental foreign policy); American Airlines,
Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966) (certain
classes of cases).
Three important cases in which the court imposed additional rulemaking procedures
based on fairness and the types of issues involved are American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB,
Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, and International Harvester v. Ruckelshaus. In American
Airlines, considerations of fairness were held to require additional procedures, such as oral
hearings, in "certain classes of cases." 359 F.2d at 632. The hearings would be imposed
solely for "the kind of factual issues which can best be determined in the light of oral
hearings, without undue elongation of the proceeding or sacrifice of the expedition and
flexibility available in rulemaking." Id. In Walter Holm & Co., fairness, imports and the
need for coordination with government foreign policy mandated oral presentations to
Department of Agriculture officials. 449 F.2d at 1016. In addition, the court stated that
fairness "may require an opportunity for cros -examination on the crucial issues." Id. In
International Harvester, the court held that "'soft' and sensitive subjects and witnesses"
might require opportunity for cross-examination. 478 F.2d at 631. Although the court
found the Environmental Protection Agency's rulemaking procedures sufficient to give
petitioners a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the policy issues, it remanded the
case, allowing limited opportunity for cross-examination on specific technical issues "in
the interest of providing a reasoned decision." Id. at 632. The court distinguished between
imposing a general right of cross-examination, for which "there is not insignificant poten-
tial for havoc," and need for cross-examination on subjects "which could not be ade-
quately ventilated under the general procedures." Id. at 631.
40. See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 385, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974)(Clean Air Act); Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238,
1259-60 (D.C. Cir. 1973)(Natural Gas Act); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846,
850 (D.C. Cir. 1972)(Clean Air Act); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354
F.2d 608, 612 (2d Cir. 1965)(Federal Power Act). The decision in Mobil Oil Corp. is an
example of judicial imposition of adjudicatory procedures in informal rulemaking pur-
suant to the interpretation of a federal statute. The Mobil Oil court concluded, from "an
analysis of the regulatory scheme envisioned by Congress in passing the Natural Gas Act,"
that cross-examination or an effective substitute would create an adequate record for
judicial review. 483 F.2d at 1262. Other courts have remanded rulemaking cases for addi-
tional procedures such as supplying implementing statements to inform the court as to
the basis for the promulgation of particular air quality standards. See, e.g., Portland
Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, supra; Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, supra.
41. See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973); Portland
Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1973); International Harvester v.
Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d
846 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
[Vol. 26:666
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Natural Resources, no case had interpreted NEPA to require additional
rulemaking procedures. Most NEPA cases have involved faulty or non-
existent environmental impact statements, which is a violation of
§102(2)(C) of the Act." When cases have been remanded for further
rulemaking proceedings under NEPA, the specific procedures have been
left to the agency's discretion.43 For example, in Calvert Cliffs' Coordi-
nating Committee v. Atomic Energy Commission," the leading nuclear
reactor licensing case, the Commission's rules were remanded because
they did not consider a wide range of environmental issues as required
under NEPA. The only criterion imposed by the court was that NEPA's
mandate of a "careful and informed decisionmaking process" be carried
out by the agency. 5 Seemingly, Natural Resources goes further in sug-
gesting that NEPA itself cannot be met without the imposition of more
stringent procedural guidelines.
B. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
In Natural Resources, the court held that the NRC violated NEPA's
mandate of a "careful and informed decisionmaking process."4 The
court stated that the NRC's failure to address information contrary to
its own position and to articulate its reasoning fully was arbitrary and
capricious action. 7 Consequently, the court remanded the portions of
the rule pertaining to the environmental impact of nuclear waste man-
agement.48
Petitioners, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and Consoli-
dated National Intervenors, Inc., 9 contended that the NRC's denial of
discovery and cross-examination at the rulemaking hearing 0 violated
42. See note 10 supra. See also Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway,
524 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1975); Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481
F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d
827 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
43. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1115.
46. 547 F.2d at 654.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 655.
49. Consolidated National Intervenors is a group composed of approximately 80 public
interest organizations and individuals. Id. at 637 n.2.
50. 38 FED. REG. 49 (1973).
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both due process and the NEPA requirement of a meaningful review.5'
Petitioners argued that the court and participants had been deprived of
"any effective means of determining whether the agency arrived at its
decision in an informed and proper manner."5 In remanding, the court
explained that it was more concerned that the agency's record thor-
oughly ventilated the issues of radioactive waste management than with
the types of procedures the agency used.53 Thus, the court left choice of
rulemaking procedures to the agency, stating repeatedly that it had
neither the authority to dictate agency procedures for developing an
adequate record, nor the expertise to choose appropriate procedures.54
However, the court did not state clearly why the issues had not been
fully ventilated in Natural Resources. Were the procedures which the
NRC had chosen inherently inadequate in arriving at a satisfactory
record? Or were the procedures sufficient, but the NRC's manner of
carrying them out inadequate? Was the court indicating that NEPA
requires rulemaking procedures in excess of the APA minimum, and, if
so, what did the court expect of the NRC in its future rulemaking
activities?
The Natural Resources court could be saying that, while the NRC
rulemaking procedures themselves were sufficient, the manner in which
they had been performed did not meet NEPA's requirements. For exam-
ple, the court stated that the original hybrid procedures chosen by the
NRC could be used again on remand to develop the record "if adminis-
tered in a more sensitive, deliberate manner."55 On the other hand, the
court did not specifically state that the procedures. employed by the
agency were adequate in themselves. The court simply stated that the
procedures used "might" suffice.5" The court then discussed, in a foot-
note, the fact that agencies "are always free to adopt 'hybrid procedures'
beyond the minimum prescribed by 5 U.S.C. §553, and commonly do." 7
The lack of specificity shown by the majority could result in an agency
imposing a full range of additional rulemaking procedures to avoid re-
versal. As Judge Tamm stated in his concurring opinion:
51. Brief for Petitioners at 18-21, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, 547
F.2d 633 (No. 74-1586) (D.C. Cir. 1976).
52. Id.
53. 547 F.2d at 644.
54. Id. at 644, 645-46, 653. The court refers to FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line
Corp., 423 U.S. 326 (1976), in stating that it may not dictate procedures to the NRC for
"fleshing out" the record. 547 F.2d at 644 n.26.
55. Id. at 653-54.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 654 n.58.
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[Tihe administrative response to overuse of judicial imposition of
such ad hoc procedural refinements is easily foreseeable. Fearing rever-
sal, administrators will tend to over-formalize, clothing their actions
"in the full wardrobe of adjudicatory procedures," until the advantages
of informal rulemaking as an administrative tool are lost in a heap of
judicially imposed procedure. 8
Unfortunately, the court in Natural Resources did not give much
direction to agencies for future rulemaking pursuant to NEPA's man-
date of informed decisionmaking. The court stated only that the NRC
must identify and address information contrary to its own position,
articulate its reasoning, and specify the evidence on which it relies.59
This type of decisionmaking must be discussed in the record. 0 The
Natural Resources majority's lack of direction could have either a posi-
tive or negative impact upon agency rulemaking activities. While agen-
cies may initiate numerous additional procedures to avoid reversal, ulti-
mately destroying the advantages of informal rulemaking,6 it is possible
that some advantages may ensue from utilizing procedures in excess of
the APA minimum.2 For example, the use of procedural devices such
as limited cross-examination and document discovery may encourage
public participation in rulemaking and help to create a meaningful
opportunity to be heard . 3 It also can be argued that the serious hazards
inherent in nuclear waste management require thorough consideration,
despite increased costs or delay.
A possible answer to this dilemma may be found in Chief Judge Baze-
lon's separate statement. There, the Chief Judge wrote that "courts
should be reluctant to impose particular procedures on an agency, which
would result in the loss of the advantages of informal rulemaking." 4 He
58. Id. at 644.
59. Id. at 660. Judge Tamm argues that the majority fails to provide sufficient direction
to the NRC for the agency to comply with the court's mandate. Id. at 659. He favors
remand for supplementation of the record, rather than reopening the oral proceedings. Id.
Judge Tamm also states that the majority is requiring the NRC to institute rulemaking
procedures in excess of the APA minimum. Id.
60. 547 F.2d at 654.
61. Id. at 660 (Tamm, J., concurring). See also Wright, supra note 38, at 387-88.
62. For the advantages and disadvantages of hybrid rulemaking, see note 38 supra.
63. The Natural Resources court lists several devices which the NRC could have used
to create "a genuine dialogue" on the nuclear waste management issue, including limited
cross-examination, document discovery, funding independent research by intervenors,
surveys of existing literature, and memoranda explaining methodology. 547 F.2d at 1653.
For a good explanation of hybrid rulemaking devices used by the EPA in an effort to
ensure challengers of rules a meaningful opportunity to participate in rulemaking, see
Williams, supra note 38, at 448-55.
64. 547 F.2d at 655 (Bazelon, C.J., separate statement).
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added that complex scientific or technical factual issues involving
mathematical or experimental data might be "peculiarly inappro-
priate" for adjudicatory procedures.65 On the other hand, certain inter-
ests, such as "[d]ecisions in areas touching the environment" which
"affect the lives and health of all" are so important that they may
require "a greater assurance of accuracy" than §553 notice and com-
ment rulemaking can provide." Thus, the Chief Judge of the Natural
Resources court indicated the boundaries within which agencies are to
exercise their discretion as to rulemaking procedures under NEPA.
Agencies involved in environmental decisionmaking may choose §553
notice and comment procedures to develop factual issues for which adju-
dicatory procedures are inappropriate, or they may choose from a vari-
ety of "hybrid" proceedings to develop complex policy issues.67 The
important factor is not what procedures are chosen, but that the agen-
cies' decisions fully address the complex issues involved in environmen-
tal decisionmaking15 Hopefully, informed decisionmaking not only will
implement NEPA's substantive policy, but also it will insure effective
public participation in agency activities.
IMPACT OF Natural Resources UPON THE NRC's LICENSING AND
DECISIONMAKING PROCESS
What actual effect has Natural Resources had upon the NRC's nu-
clear power plant licensing process? Within a month of the court's deci-
sion, the NRC directed its staff to review the existing literature concern-
ing nuclear waste management and to produce a revised and adequately
documented analysis of the environmental costs of nuclear waste man-
agement attributable to an individual reactor."9 The NRC suspended
power plant licensing pending the staff's analysis. 0 The revised survey,
completed three months after the Natural Resources decision was ren-
dered, once again concluded that the environmental effects of nuclear
waste disposal and fuel reprocessing are small with respect to an indi-
vidual plant.7' Based upon the revised survey, a "proposed interim rule"
65. Id.
66. Id. at 656. Some issues are not appropriate for resolution by adjudicatory procedures
because they involve speculation or arbitrary judgments, and are not susceptible to proof.
See Murphy, The National Environmental Policy Act and the Licensing Process: Environ-
mentalist Magna Carta or Agency Coup de Grace?, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 963, 990-91 (1972).
67. 547 F.2d at 657.
68. Id. at 655-57.
69. 41 FED. REG. 34707 (1976).
70. Id.
71. 41 FED. REG. 49898 (1976).
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setting out a new series of values was suggested by the NRC for factoring
into the cost-benefit analysis for each power plant.72 While these values
were different from those contained in the original, remanded rule, they
nevertheless indicated the NRC's conclusion that the environmental
impact of nuclear waste management is insignificant for an individual
reactor.7 3 The NRC planned to resume the licensing of reactors, using
the interim rule until the rulemaking proceedings mandated by the
Natural Resources court were completed.74
However, before the NRC had the opportunity to announce its pro-
posal for an interim rule publicly, the court of appeals permitted the
NRC to resume licensing on a conditional basis, pending the outcome
of Vermont Yankee Power Corporation's petition for writ of certiorari.75
As a result, the NRC decided to resume licensing on the conditional
basis suggested by the court.7"
At this time, the NRC plans to use both the original rule and the
proposed interim rule in its licensing determinations.7 7 If the values
contained in the interim rule tilt the cost-benefit analysis for a nuclear
power plant against issuance of a license, the proceeding is to be sus-
pended until further action by the NRC. 8 However, the Commission did
not foresee a significant difference in result between the use of the re-
manded rule and the proposed interim rule.7"
72. 41 FED. REG. 45849, 45850 (1976). A comment period was initiated by the NRC on
the proposed series of values (called the "proposed interim rule" by the NRC). The
comment period is to be followed by the promulgation of a final interim rule, through
notice and comment rulemaking. 41 FED. REG. 34707, 34708 (1976). Finally, a public
hearing is to be held to determine whether the final interim rule should be amended for
future use in licensing. 41 FED. REG. 45849, 45851 (1976).
73. Id.
74. 41 FED. REG. 45849 (1976). The interim rule, which is to be promulgated through
notice and comment procedure, id. at 34708, is to be used for no longer than eighteen
months. Id. at 45851. The NRC predicts that rulemaking procedures pursuant to the
Natural Resources court's mandate will take approximately one year. Id. at 34707.
75. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, Nos. 74-1385, 74-1586 (D.C. Cir.,
Oct. 8, 1976). The petition for writ of certiorari was filed Sept. 21, 1976, two months after
the Natural Resources decision was rendered. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 76-419, 45 U.S.L.W. 3285 (Oct. 12, 1976).
76. 41 FED. REG. 49898 (Nov. 11, 1976).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. A question which must be examined is how the NRC will handle conditionally
licensed power plants if the Supreme Court upholds the decision in Natural Resources to
remand the NRC's original rule. Both the interim rule and the original rule will have been
used to grant the conditional license. If the Supreme Court affirms the court's decision
(that the original rule is invalid), then the rulemaking record of the interim rule also will
have to be scrutinized for thorough ventilation of the issues. If the interim rule has been
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It appears that the NRC plans to reopen its rulemaking proceeding
for the purpose of supplementing the record on the fuel reprocessing and
waste disposal issues. 0 The NRC also plans to determine whether, on
the basis of the supplemented record, the original table of values should
be amended, and if so, in what manner.8 The procedures to be used by
the NRC are to be announced in a notice of hearing. The NRC has
indicated that it may use the same procedures it used in promulgating
the original rule, 2 but it will exercise the reasoned decisionmaking man-
dated by the Natural Resources court.13
CONCLUSION
Superficially, not much seems to have changed since Natural
Resources was decided; the NRC is pursuing its licensing activities as
usual. However, in addition to reopening its rulemaking process as a
result of the Natural Resources decision, the NRC has announced that
it is in the preparatory stages of developing a general regulatory frame-
work for nuclear waste management.8 Also, several cases have been
reopened by parties seeking to litigate the issue of power plant licensing
and radioactive waste management. 5
It is still too early to determine whether the NRC is carrying out the
court's mandate in Natural Resources satisfactorily. Some critics have
argued that the revised analysis fails to meet the court's order because
it does not fully address the environmental impacts of a variety of nu-
clear wastes at different stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. Others have
promulgated consistently with Natural Resources, that rule undoubtedly will be used for
granting power plant licenses until the final rulemaking proceedings are completed. If,
however, the interim rule is found not to comply with the court's mandate in Natural
Resources, then licenses will have to be granted on a case-by-case basis until the final rule
has been promulgated, or until a satisfactory interim rule has been developed. The effect
of case-by-case adjudication of individual proposals for licenses could be extremely time-
consuming for both the NRC and the nuclear power plant company, and could delay the
construction of nuclear plants considerably. In addition, poorly-financed public interest
groups and interested individuals might not be able to participate in all of the proceedings
in which they are interested.
80. 41 FED. REG. 34707 (1976).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 34708.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 34707 n.1.
85. See, e.g., Long Island Lighting Co. v. Lloyd Harbor Study Group, Inc., 45 U.S.L.W.
3435 (Dec. 14, 1976); Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 45 U.S.L.W. 3349 (Nov. 9, 1976); Consumers Power Co. v. Aeschliman, 45 U.S.L.W.
3336 (Nov. 2, 1976).
86. House of Representatives subcommittee field hearing, 7 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 779-80
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stated that Congress may step in and enact new legislation setting radio-
active waste controls if the NRC does not implement NEPA's require-
ments of full consideration of environmental issues such as waste man-
agement.87 In any event, the court of appeals has indicated that it will
settle only for a high level of decisionmaking on the part of the NRC in
the area of nuclear waste disposal and fuel reprocessing. If the NRC
attempts further rulemaking activities at a lesser level, it may find itself
before the court once again. This time, however, the court may not stay
its mandate to allow resumption of licensing based on an inadequately
supported rule. If that occurs, licensing will have to take place on a case-
by-case basis, resulting in a significant delay in the construction of
nuclear power facilities.
Laurel Breitkopf
(Sept. 24, 1976) (comments of Richard Cotton, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
staff attorney).
87. Id. at 780 (comments of subcommittee chairman Leo J. Ryan (D-Calif.)).
